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BANISHING THE PREMATURE SUITOR-A SURPRISING
USE FOR THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY*
THE Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has recently applied
"the venerable but creaking"' doctrine of sovereign immunity to bar two
suits for anticipatory relief against administrative action. The Supreme Court
has granted certiorari in both cases, and may use them as occasions for clari-
fying the uses of the doctrine in administrative law. In Reisman v. Caplin,2
attorneys for a taxpayer who is threatened by civil and criminal actions seek
to quash an administrative subpoena issued by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, and to secure declaratory and injunctive relief. The subpoena is di-
rected against a firm of public accountants hired by the attorneys to assist
them in preparing a defense in the civil action, and requires the production
of various documents in the accountants' possession. Plaintiffs contend that
the documents are privileged to the taxpayer by virtue of the fifth amend-
ment, and to the attorneys, as a work-product of the attorney-client relation-
ship. In Kennedy v. Rabinowitz,3 plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that
they, as attorneys representing the "mercantile and financial interests" of the
Cuban government in this country, are not required to register under the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938.4 The suit was brought in response
to conduct of the Attorney General, who has demanded repeatedly, in cor-
respondence and personal conferences, that plaintiffs register.
Use of the sovereign immunity doctrine to bar suit in Reisman and Rabino-
witz does not mean that plaintiffs will not be able to contest judicially the
correctness of the executive action threatening their interests once the Execu-
tive seeks aid of the courts. The holding in both cases is simply that at the
present stage relief is not available. The Internal Revenue Code and the
Foreign Agents Registration Act are both read to indicate that Congress has
not consented to suit, and, the court concludes, the citizen may not successfully
initiate judicial action to test his claim of right against a sovereign which has
not consented to be sued. But upon analysis of both cases, and the contrasts
*Reisman v. Caplin, 317 F2d 123 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 32 U.S.L. Wm K
4105 (Jan. 20, 1964). Kennedy v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 84
Sup. Ct. 71 (1963) (No. 287).
1. Kennedy v. Rabinowitz, 318 F2d 181, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
2. 317 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 32 U.S.L. WEaK 4105 (Jan. 20,
1964).
3. 318 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 84 Sup. Ct. 71 (1963) (No. 287).
4. 52 Stat. 634 (1938), as amended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1958), as amended, 75
Stat. 784 (1961), 22 U.S.C. §§ 611, 613 (Supp. IV, 1962). Plaintiff alleged that they
were exempt from the coverage of the Act because their activities fell within section
3(d) (22 U.S.C. § 613(d)) exempting:
Any person engaging or agreeing to engage only in private and nonpolitical finan-
cial or mercantile activities in furtherance of the bona fide trade or commerce of
such foreign principal.
5. Joint Appendix, p. 5A, Kennedy v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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which exist between them, it becomes apparent that the factors which troubled
the court cannot be resolved satisfactorily by the sovereign immunity doctrine.
Rather, they seem all to be associated with the doctrines of judicial self-regard
-the techniques of "not doing," ripeness, justiciability, and the like-which
have fascinated commentators 6 and stimulated great controversy on the
Supreme Court.7 The decisions in Reisman and Rabinowitz will be criticized
not on their interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity but on their
avoidance of the complex issues often clustered under the rubric "judicial
restraint" :8 at what point should courts begin their critique of administrative
decisions.
In Reisman, the court seemed most influenced by two factors. First, it was
unlikely that the accountants had really subjected plaintiffs to substantial
peril of loss of right. Although allegedly ready to surrender the documents
without awaiting enforcement of the subpoena, because of the threat of con-
tempt sanctions, the accountants joined plaintiffs in the prayer for injunctive
relief against themselves as well as the government. 9 The plaintiffs were
probably attempting to secure expiration of the statute of limitations on the
action for fraud.'0 Second, regardless of the reality of the threatened injury,
it was doubtful that plaintiffs had a substantial claim to present relief. The
government argued that the elaborateness of the procedures provided in the
tax statute signified a congressional desire to avoid delay by consolidating
proceedings in a mandatory framework; furthermore, the tax statute provided
that a judicial forum be available at a later stage, though still before imposition
of any sanction.11 Indeed, plaintiffs could probably have obtained adequate
6. See, e.g., BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH (1962) ; Comment, Threat of
Enforcement-Prerequisite of a Justiciable Controversy, 62 COLUm. L. Ray. 106 (1962) ;
Davis, Ripeness of Government Action for Judicial Review, 68 HAnv. L. Rav. 1326 (1955) ;
Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. Rav. 1265 (1961).
7. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); International Longshoremen's
Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954) ; Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948).
8. For discussion of these complexities compare BicxEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANcHE ch. 4 (1962), with Jaffe and Davis, note 6 supra.
9. 317 F.2d at 125.
10. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6531, establishes a six year statute of limitations "for
offenses involving the defrauding . . . of the United States." The summonses issued by
the Commissioner were seeking information as to the taxpayer's individual liabilities
for the years 1957-59, and the liabilities of certain corporations in which he held an
interest for the years 1953-59. Brief for Respondent, p. 35, Reisman v. Caplin (No. 119).
The summonses were originally served upon the accountants in June of 1961.
11. (a) Jurisdiction of district court. - If any person is summoned under the in-
ternal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or
other data, the United States district court for the district in which such person
resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such
attendance testimony or production of books, papers ....
(b) Enforcement. - Whenever any person summoned . . . neglects or refuses to
obey such summons, or to produce books, papers, records ... , the Secretary or his
delegate may apply to the judge of the district court... for an attachment against
him as for a contempt. It shall be the duty of the judge or commissioner to hear
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relief against their accountants by securing an order enjoining submission of
the papers prior to entry of a valid enforcement decree.- 2 But the Reisman
opinion merely touches upon these considerations of gravity of harm and
statutory intent concerning the timing of judicial review. It depends for its
result upon a conclusion about sovereign consent, derived wholly from stereo-
typed doctrine: the relief sought would "interfere with the public administra-
tion,"' 3 as a matter of conclusive characterization rather than fact; the suit
does not fall within the traditional exceptions of action in excess of statutory
or constitutional authority. The court's vague allusion to the possibility that
"policy considerations, not always apparent on the surface, are powerful
agents of decision"' 4 seems its only attempt to integrate the apparently de-
terminative factors into its legal reasoning.
In Rabinowitz, the factual and legal difficulties of the plaintiffs in Reisman
did not seem to be present. Since the Attorney General admitted that he had
the application, and, if satisfactory proof is made, to issue an attachment, directed
to some proper officer for the arrest of such person, and upon his being brought
before him to proceed to a hearing of the case.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7604.
Plaintiffs take the position that the accountants could reasonably fear to resist the
subpoenas because of the possibility that the Service will elect to bring criminal contempt
proceedings against them under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7210. They rely heavily upon
the Second Circuit's opinion in Application of Colton, 291 F.2d 487 (1961), where that
court held, at 491-92, that since the "criminal penalty of § 7210 is not contingent upon
prior action under ... § 7604," and since the witness could, conceivably, never have
an opportunity to answer and defend himself, a motion to quash a subpoena and get
anticipatory relief from its enforcement may be entertained. In Reismnan, the government
assured the Court of Appeals that the criminal contempt sanction had only been used
once, in a case of egregiously bad faith, and that the section would not be called into
effect in cases of good faith non-compliance. Relying on this assurance, the court refused
to adopt the Colton reasoning. 317 F2d 123, 126.
12. Such an injunction would have no restraining effect upon the government, of
course; nor would the government have to be impleaded as an indispensable party, or
for any other reason. See, e.g., Fay v. Miller, 183 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Federal
Trade Commission v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962). It is noteworthy
that the government has conceded that "such an order would eliminate . . . any risk that
a refusal to comply by the accountants might be regarded as evidence of bad faith war-
ranting an application for attachment under Section 7604(b) or prosecution under
Section 7210." Brief for Respondent, p. 46, Reisman v. Caplin (No. 119) ; note 97 infra.
13. 317 F.2d at 125. This appears in every sovereign immunity case, and provides
the doctrine's only rationale of any significance. See generally, Byse, Proposed Reforms in
Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties,
Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1479, 1484-92 (1962). Block, Suits Against Government
Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HAiv. L. REv. 1060-61 (1946), argues
that even this lone rationale lacks force.
14. 317 F.2d at 126. The court does point out that there must be additional pro-
ceedings before the subpoenaed parties can be compelled to produce; but the policy
reasons which inclined the court to refuse anticipatory relief are left in the realm of
conjecture.
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requested registration,15 and since no third party-was involved, the immediacy
or reality of the plaintiffs' plight was not questioned. Unless declaratory relief
is available, the plaintiffs dilemma is obvious. They must register and thus
waive the opportunity to contest the Attorney General's reading of the statute.
If they refuse to register, they risk criminal indictment with possible fine
and imprisonment, 6 if they are ultimately found in the wrong. The third
possibility, of course, is that they surrender Cuba as a client. On its surface,
the Declaratory Judgment Act 17 appears to make declaratory relief available
to persons in the situation in which the Rabinowitz plaintiffs found them-
selves.' 8 And there seems to be no statutory language, comprehensive statutory
scheme, or need to avoid delay, to suggest that Congress felt that anticipatory
relief was inappropriate in this particular instance. Indeed, as the carefully
reasoned dissent of Judge Fahy pointed out, the suit seemed in every way
appropriate to judicial cognizance under the Declaratory Judgment Act, and
well within the precedent of prior cases where suit for declaratory relief was
entertained without reference to considerations of sovereign immunity.19
15. See 318 F.2d at 182, and the Attorney General's answer to the complaint for
declaratory judgment, paragraph 5, Joint Appendix p. 22A.
16. Punishment may be by "fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for
not more than five years, or both." Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 56 Stat.
257, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 618 (1958).
17. 62 Stat. 964 (1934), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958).
18. S. Rep. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 2-3 (1934):
The procedure [for declaratory judgments adopted in some states] has been
especially useful in avoiding the necessity, now so often present, of having to
act at one's peril or to act on one's own interpretation of his rights because of
fear of incurring damages. So now it is often necessary, in the absence of declara-
tory judgment procedure, to violate a statute in order to obtain a judicial determi-
nation of its meaning or validity.
See also, id. at 6; Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52
YALE L.J. 445, 461-62 (1943); Comment, The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 21
VA. L. REv. 35, 40-43, 49-50 (1934) ; ANDERSON, DECLAATORY JUDGMENTS §§ 644, 727,
728, 734 (2d ed. 1951).
19. Judge Fahy argued:
The suit is not accurately described as one to enjoin a criminal prosecution.
It is to determine the existence of an obligation on appellees' part affirmatively to
register in circumstances which create a justiciable issue in that regard. No ad-
ministrative remedy is provided and there is no remedy at law comparable to that
available through the Declaratory Judgment Act. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474 (1959). The Act combines with equity to afford, a remedy, for equity is served
by not forcing registration in the face of well-founded doubt of the need to do
so....
318 F.2d at 184.
The Government does not contend that declaratory judgments may never be entered
against officers of the United States or that an express consent to be sued is always
necessary. See Greene v. McElroy, supra, where there was no discussion of the
immunity doctrine; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath . . . where
the Court sustained jurisdiction and negated the possibility of immunity; and the
United Public Workers v. Mitchell....
Id. at 185-86.
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Why, then, was declaratory judgment not forthcoming? The court of
appeals was troubled by the thought that the suit, although in- form merely
a request for a declaration of right, was in substance a request for an injunc-
tion against a pending criminal prosecution.2 0 Traditionally, courts have re-
fused to entertain such suits on equitable principles ;21 but there are cases to
the contrary. Such departures have appeared to depend on the nature of the
offense 22 and the severity of the harm 23 which would result to the plaintiff
if prior restraint of criminal prosecution was not afforded. Rabinowitz seems
to fit well the pattern made by these departures.2 4 The court also invoked
20. Every time the majority referred to the Act in regard to any important aspect
of its argument, it labelled it a "criminal" law. See 318 F.2d at 183, and especially foot-
note 9. Judge Fahy took pains to meet this viewpoint. 318 F.2d at 183-84.
21. These principles are of ancient and respectable origin, see Douglas v. City of
Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1943) ; Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory En-
forcenicnt of State Penal Laws, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 1103, 1133-40 (1961) ; 4 PoMERoY,
Equrriy JURISPRUDENCE § 1361b (4th ed. 1941). According to these principles, plaintiff will
be denied relief when he has failed to show a real threat of irreparable injury if the prose-
cution is allowed to begin or continue; or when he cannot show that his remedy at law
-his defense to the prosecution-will be inadequate to vindicate his rights; or when
he cannot prove that he is being unreasonably harassed or subjected to unnecessary
and repetitive prosecutions.
22. Thus, declaratory judgment is often successfully invoked to bar criminal prose-
cutions to enforce regulatory statutes, because the offense does not involve "moral
turpitude." Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912) (federal statute provided
$2500 fines for building bulkheads or wharves beyond line established by Secretary of
War); Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co., 305 U.S. 177 (1938) (Railway Labor Act
imposed criminal sanctions for wilful failure to comply with statutory command to
post certain notices); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (state statute providing
for segregated seating in public transportation enforceable with criminal penalties);
Railway Mail Assoc. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945) (penalties of $500 fine and 90 days
imprisonment for denying a person membership in a labor organization on grounds
of race, color or creed); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (fines and im-
prisonment for violating the Anti-Alien Land Law of Washington, by selling or leasing
land to aliens). See also Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) ; Hynes v. Grimes
Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
23. The severity of the harm is measured in the cases cited in note 22 supra, and
note 75 infra, according to the size of the threatened penalty in dollars and cents, the
amount of damage a prosecution would bring, and the probability of irreparable injury
to whatever interest complainant is urging. The Supreme Court recently held that a
person ordered by the Federal Trade Commission to file special reports pursuant to
Section 6(b) of the F.T.C. Act, 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1958), may seek
a judicial test of the order without awaiting the initiation of enforcement and penalty pro-
ceedings by the Attorney General. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 226
(1961). The plaintiff's potential liability for "ruinous" penalties plainly accounts for this
holding. See Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal
Laws, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1133-40 (1961); Comment, Threat of Enforcement-
Prerequisite of a Justiciable Controversy, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 106, 113-17 (1962), and
cases cited.
24. The prospect of $10,000 in fines and five years imprisonment seems to present
a sufficiently severe danger of injury in light of present case law. Note 23 supra. Plaintiffs
further argue with some force that either prosecution or registration would "interfere
19641
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the doctrine of sovereign immunity out of reluctance to "interfere with the
public administration." 25 But it is not obvious that interference arising from
declaratory relief, if it were granted in Rabinowitz, would be more excessive
than the interference which has arisen from the granting of such relief against
executive officers in similar situations.26 In this posture, it would seem that
only wariness introduced by the fact that relations with a hostile foreign
power were involved could explain the court's abrupt conclusion that sovereign
immunity barred suit, or account for its unsupported reply to plaintiffs' claim
of right under the Declaratory Judgment Act. In response to that claim, the
court asserted, "philosophically, we may agree. But Congress has decreed
otherwise, at least so far as agents representing foreign governments are
concerned.
'27
Use of the sovereign immunity doctrine in these cases is surprising. Not
only is the doctrine in general disfavor,28 but in almost all instances where the
doctrine has been applied, the private parties were pursuing assets in gov-
ernment hands. For example, in the leading Supreme Court case construing
the doctrine, Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,2 9 the private
complainant asked that specific performance be granted against the War
Assets Administrator to force him to convey coal which he held in alleged
breach of contract with complainant. The Court stated that this remedy must
with their practice of law and their ability to employ and retain associate counsel," upon
which they are particularly dependent. Petition for Certiorari, p. 7, Rabinowitz v. Kennedy
(No. 287). The counter-argument, that courts will not intervene if only one offense and
one prosecution is involved, is not firmly established. Compare Beal v. Missouri Pacific
R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941) and Speilman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935)
with Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) and Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958).
25. 318 F.2d at 181. On the "interference" rationale of the sovereign immunity
doctrine, see note 13 supra.
26. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)
(especially Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence and cases cited, id. at 149) ; Harmon
v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) ; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) ;
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) ; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) ; Perkins v.
Elg, 99 F.2d 408 (D.C.Cir. 1938), aff'd, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) ; Udall v. Wisconsin, 306
F.2d 790 (D.C.Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 969 (1963). As the cases indicate, almost
no Executive department has been free from judicial "interference with the public ad-
ministration."
27. 318 F.2d at 183.
28. Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940); Larson
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 723 (1949) (Dissenting opinion
by Frankfurter, 3.), National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359 (1955).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has not always been as favorable to
the doctrine as the Rabinowitz and Reisman cases might indicate; see, e.g., Clackamus
County v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C.Cir. 1954), vacated as moot, 379 U.S. 909 (1955).
The literature consists entirely of biting criticism. See, e.g., 3 DAVIs, ADMNISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 27.10 (1958) ; Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Ju-
dicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REv.
1479, 1484-92 (1962) ; Jaffe, Suits Against Sovereigns, Governments and Officers, I, 77
HAnv. L. Rsv. 1, 19-30 (1963).
29. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
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be denied irrespective of whether the coal was wrongfully withheld;30 com-
plainant's exclusive remedy was an action for money damages in the Court
of Claims.31 The Court was most concerned with the possibility that the
government-representing the "community as a whole" in allocating fuel re-
sources in a post-war economy-would be "stopped in its tracks by any plaintiff
who presents a disputed question of property or contract right,"32 rather
than taking his alternate remedy in the Court of Claims. In response to the
same fears, the sovereign immunity doctrine has been applied to deny specific
relief against the government's actions in administering the national forests ;33
in using complainant's property for the national defense ;34 in the dissemination
of vital information, arguably in violation of private patents, concerning further
research in atomic energy ;35 and in building a hydroelectric and land reclama-
tion project allegedly in violation of complainant's property rights. 36 Where
a direct restraint is sought on the government's ability to deal freely with
property in its hands, there is an obvious possibility of intolerable interference
with projects, such as fuel allocation or land reclamation, that are vital to the
health and welfare of the community at large.
In disputes not involving government deployment of property, it is also
possible that undue interference with administrative functions will occur if
private interests are granted the right to seek affirmative protection from
executive action. But the reasons for avoiding this kind of interference are
not so obvious. And the alternative means of redress in these circumstances
do not vindicate minimal notions of fairness as clearly as, for example, in
Larson, where a monetary remedy is available through the Court of Claims.
There is still controversy regarding whether every executive "wrong," or
every "wrong" authorized by Congress, must, by constitutional compulsion,
30. Id. at 693.
31. Id. at 704. The existence of the Court of Claims and the availability of a remedy
in it enabled the Court to distinguish away the leading case of United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196 (1882), which might have required a holding contrary to that which the majority
reached, 337 U.S. at 696-97 & n.17. The Lee case was a suit against federal officers to
recover the Robert E. Lee estate in Arlington, Virginia, which they were holding as a
military station and cemetery, within the scope of their authority. The Court held the
tax sale by which the property had been acquired illegal, and decreed specific relief, the
return of the property to the plaintiff.
Cf., Jaffe, Suits Against Sovereigns, Governments, and Officers, I, 77 HARv. L. Ray.
1, 23-26 (1963).
32. 337 U.S. at 704.
33. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962). Plaintiff sought, under claim of title,
to recover lands seized by Forest Service Officers of the Department of Agriculture.
Lee, note 32 supra, was again distinguished. Id. at 647 n.8.
34. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896) (suit for specific relief against unauthorized
use by the United States of a military invention to which plaintiff held the patent).
35. Spevack v. Strauss, 248 F.2d 752 (D.C.Cir. 1957) vacated 335 U.S. 601 (1958).
36. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). The unanimous decision was unusual, given
the usual controversy attending use of the doctrine. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (6-3), and Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643
(1962) (5-2).
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be ultimately remediable in the courts.37 But Congress and the Executive
have tended to refrain from directly confronting the courts with the possi-
bility of judicial impotence. 38 Given that Congress has authorized some degree
of judicial interference in executive action through the Declaratory Judgment
Act,39 and that in the traditional instances where the sovereign immunity
doctrine applies to protect property in government hands,40 Congress has
taken care to provide some remedy for governmental wrongs, 41 there is no
pressing necessity for courts to be excessively wary of "interfering" with
37. This controversy reaches the very foundation of judicial review of congressional
and executive actions, for the dispute centers on the legitimacy and proper role of judicial
review. One school
would rest the institution of judicial review on the foundation of the opinion in
Marbury v. Madison, or even on an independent, more scrupulous but quite similar
process of deduction from the constitutional text.
BIcl, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH 118 (1962). The other believes that the in-
stitution of judicial review cannot be derived from the Constitution itself, but rather was
imported into the system in order to keep the system from "collapsing." See HAND, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 14-15, 27-29 (1958). Compare Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 3, 9 (1959), with HAND, supra, p. 15. For a
thorough discussion, see BIcKEL, op. cit. supra ch. 4 (1962), and for a middle ground, see
Jaffe, Right to Judicial Review, 71 Hanv. L. REv. 401, 769, 800-14 (1958). Jaffe, relying
heavily on historical exegesis, finds a presumption of judicial review of administrative
action. Id. at 420-37.
38. See, e.g., Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953); with its power to
restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Congress could insulate many
types of administrative and Executive action from judicial review; it has done so in
only a very few instances. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958):
In case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal
taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking
such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such
declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall
be reviewable as such.
See note 18 supra.
40. See notes 29-36 supra and accompanying text.
41. This is the function of the Federal Tort Claims Act-see, particularly, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (1958)-and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1504 (1958), permitting suit in the Court ot
Claims for damages in tort, contract or other actions. The sovereign immunity doctrine
today may more fairly be said to regulate the procedures by which relief may be obtained
than the possibility of obtaining any relief whatsoever. If a genuine wrong has been done
by an officer of the United States acting within his statutory authority and within
constitutional limits, relief may always be had, by congressional consent-but only by
following the procedure Congress has provided, and only in the forum which Congress
has established for this purpose. On the other hand, if the officer has acted in excess of
his statutory authority, or in violation of the Constitution, then the immunity of the
sovereign will not protect him, Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 701-02 (1949), and specific relief may be obtained in any federal judicial forum,
at law or in equity. Jaffe, Suits Against Sovereigns, Governments and Officers, I, 77
HARv. L. RaV. 1, 18, 38-39 (1963).
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executive actions. Indeed, the existence of the Declaratory Judgment Act
may signify congressional recognition that, although direct restraint on gov-
ernmental use of property may properly be deemed undue interference with
governmental processes, a blanket presumption against judicial intervention
need not be applied where there is no involvement of public property or funds
and the governmental action at issue affects private interests alone. Because
the sovereign immunity doctrine is framed in vague, conclusory terms,4 2 and
has been formulated essentially in contexts where the dangers of excessive
judicial interference with governmental functions are-at least to the courts-
so obvious as hardly to require elucidation,43 the sovereign immunity doctrine
42. The entire concept of congressional consent to suit is vague and uncertain. Is
"consent" now absent only where Congress has refused its consent by statute as it has with
regard to tax matters in the Declaratory Judgment Act, see note 39 supra, or with regard
to the collection of taxes, as in § 7421(a) of the INTER.AL REVENUE CODE OF 1954? If so,
there can be little confusion in the courts; see, e.g., Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1962). Or is consent also lacking where Congress has established a statutory
procedure for getting judicial relief, and from this the courts are able to conclude that all
others are excluded? See, e.g., United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 (1919). The
government's argument in Reisman v. Caplin is the latter - that the statutory procedures
set out in note 1 supra, are the exclusive means for obtaining judicial review and that
Congress has given its consent to no other method. Brief for Respondent, p. 23, Reisman
v. Caplin, (No. 119). Or on the other hand, does the doctrine of consent to suit play a
strictly negative role, that unless Congress grants consent by some affirmative act, it is to
be held as denying it? The criterion for its invocation, does the suit at hand "interfere
with the public administration" [Kennedy v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 181, 183 (D.C. Cir.
1963) ; Reisman v. Caplin, 317 F.2d 123, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1963)], is similarly conclusory
and uncertain. For example, what kind of interference is thought undesirable? Certainly
not all; see note 26 mtpra for instances where judicial interference in the administrative
process unashamedly took place. Furthermore, the ultimate criteria as to whether or not
a plaintiff may take his case out of the sovereign immunity rule are also conclusory.
Complainant may only get specific relief against an officer of the government if he can
show that that officer was not acting for the sovereign; but was acting so illegally as to be
personally responsible; that is, the officer must be acting in excess of his statutory author-
ity or that authority, or its exercise in the particular case, must be shown to be consti-
tutionally void. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-02
(1949). This showing must be made on the pleadings, as the Court points out, id. at 690.
For in order to decide, under this test, whether or not he will take jurisdiction, the judge
must make a preliminary determination on the merits of plaintiff's case. Such a decision,
as to whether the officer acted in excess of statutory authority, or unconstitutionally, re-
quires some statutory interpretation, a reading of congressional intent, so far as prac-
ticable, and a somewhat careful review of the facts-all on the pleadings. A more con-
clusory test is hardly imaginable; for the factors said to give the Court jurisdiction are
usually the very basis of a plaintiff's case on the merits. But see, Comment, Immunity of
Government Officers: Effects of the Larson Case, 8 STAN. L. REv. 683, 684-86 (1956).
43. The government-held property or government funds cases, notes 30-36 supra,
provide the foundation of the doctrine. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682 (1949), where the Supreme Court made a conscious effort to clarify the
sovereign immunity doctrine and to delineate its areas of applicability, involved government
property and funds, was written in that context (see, e.g., the majority's discussion, 337
U.S. at 687-88, and Douglas, J.'s concurrence, id. at 705), discussed, nothing else, and relied
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is an inadequate vehicle to guide the judiciary in determining when relief
from executive wrongs generally should be denied as premature.
Despite the inadequacies of the sovereign immunity doctrine, the reasoning
in Reisman and Rabinowitz may be defensible if it can be shown that Congress
intended to provide no judicial relief at an early stage of the particular ad-
ministrative proceeding involved. This indication of legislative purpose would
have to be found in the particular statutes under which the cases arose, for
the Declaratory Judgment Act is broadly framed, and undifferentiated as to
the areas of administrative action to which it applies. Such an indication might
have been derived in the Reismnan case, for example, where the elaborate
procedural apparatus provided for by the tax statutes, 44 designed for orderly
presentation of questions and speedy flow of cases along the administrative
network, might be taken to signify that Congress meant to exclude other, more
dilatory modes of raising issues.45 In Rabinowitz, however, the court's bald
assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, such a result could have been
reached only with difficulty. There is neither legislative history nor any
special characteristic of the statutory procedures under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act to suggest that its applicability may only be challenged in a
defense to a criminal prosecution brought under it. Indeed, the statutory
exclusion for "non-political, mercantile and financial" agents implies that an
early reading of the statute's applicability should be available.46 As conceded
by the majority, the criminal sanctions of the statute were primarily designed
entirely upon cases presenting the same obvious danger of stopping the government in its
tracks. See Jaffe, Suits Against Sovereigns, Governments, and Officers, I, 77 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 21, 29 (1963) ; Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Re-
view, 75 HAkv. L. Rzv. 1479, 1528 (1962). That the benefit of the doctrine in this area
is so obvious as to hardly require elucidation has been the subject of comment by the
D.C. Circuit in the past:
If the Treasury were subject to the multifarious claims which may arise against
the Government without the necessity of prior Government consent to suit, the
Treasury could be depleted and governmental policy hampered. . ..The interest
of the citizen in obtaining redress against the Government is thus balanced against
the need to protect the revenues and property of the United States.
Story v. Snyder, 184 F.2d 454, 457 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 (1950). See
also Carrow, Sovereign Immunity in Administrative Law--A New Diagnosis, 9 J. Ptm.
L. 1 (1960).
44. See note 11 supra.
45. That suit for anticipatory relief, declaratory judgment or injunction, may create
considerable delay is evident from the history of Reisman itself, and other similar cases;
see In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., 311 F.2d 12, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 918 (1963). In similar circumstances, the Supreme Court has shown concern
that suits for anticipatory relief may delay and cripple the administrative process. See,
e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375, 383, 386-87 (1938).
See generally Sherwood, The Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas, 44 CoLu1S. L.
RE-v. 531 (1944); Parker, Contempt Procedure in the Enforcement of Administrative
Orders, 40 ILL. L. REv. 344 (1946) ; cf. note 41 supra.
46. Compare DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 90 n.31 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. granted,
32 U.S.L. WEK 3003 (July 2, 1963) (No. 159).
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to promote compliance with its regulatory purposes; and to the degree that
they served this purpose rather than the goal of penalizing, as for moral
turpitude, the activity itself, the conduct involved would lie well within the
intended bounds of the Declaratory Judgment Act.47 And construction of a
statute so as to preclude completely the possibility of an early reading under
that Act or in equity has been undertaken in the past only upon the showing
of a clear command of the statute in issue, whether embodied in language
or statutory purpose.
48
That relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act is not precluded by clear
congressional intent does not mean, however, that it must be granted. There
may be cases where, for peculiarly judicial reasons, early review would be
inappropriate. The legislature did not go so far as to command that the courts
hear all claims, if indeed it could ;49 the granting of declaratory relief was
left to the discretion of the courts, who soon declared it equitable in nature
subject to the normal prerequisites for discretionary relief.50 Some indication
of what these prerequisites might be appears in the concurrence of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath.5" His
opinion in that case, a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Attorney General in connection with the Attorney General's attempt to place
plaintiffs on the Attorney General's Subversive Organizations List, set forth
the following criteria for testing the justiciability of actions against the gov-
47. 318 F.2d at 183. See notes 19, 20, 22 supra.
48. This is at least the rule to which the Supreme Court has always paid lip-service
in the leading cases. See, e.g., Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). It is well stated,
and the leading cases are cited, by Brennan, J., dissenting with Warren, C.J., and Black
and Douglas, JJ., in Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1960).
49. Definite limits are set by the U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, the "case and controversy"
requirement. Since Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792), and its ban on "advisory
opinions," it has been clear that the other branches cannot give those two mystic words
"case" and "controversy" any greater or lesser meaning than the Supreme Court deems
appropriate. See BicxEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCC 113-27 (1962).
50. Although the Supreme Court very early in the Act's history made it clear that
irreparable injury was not prerequisite to justiciability in declaratory judgment suits,
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933), it did not adopt quite the liberal attitude toward
the Act which its proponents had hoped. Compare Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes
by Declaratory Action, 52 YALE L.J. 445, 449-56, 482-84, 492-93 (1943), with Rescue
Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 573 n.41 (1947). See Colegrove v. Green, 328
U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.) (the test for granting a declaration "is whether
the controversy 'would be justiciable in this Court if presented in a suit for injunction' ").
See also Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 243 (1952). See generally
Comment, Threat of Enforcement-Prerequisite of a .Tsticiable Controversy, 62 CoLUM.
L. REv. 106, 117-24 (1962).
51. 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951). See also opinions by Frankfurter, J., in Rochester Tel.
Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939) ; Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 497
(1952) (dissenting opinion) ; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541,
551 (1948) (dissenting opinion) ; and his more recent exposition of the justiciability doc-
trine, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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ernment: "Will the action challenged at any time substantially affect the
'legal' interests of any person ?,,-2 "Does the action challenged affect petitioner
with sufficient 'directness' ?' 53 "Is the action challenged sufficiently final?"54
Although these three questions may tend to overlap in many instances,
Reisman and Rabinowitz present cases where the chief obstacle to a decision
on the merits relates to the last. In Reisman, the challenged action might
not appear "sufficiently final" because further proceedings are required before
the accountants can be compelled to produce the documents. And, in Rabino-
witz, plaintiffs' essential problem lies in the fact that the Foreign Agents
Registration Act is ultimately enforced through criminal prosecution; the At-
torney General has not yet instituted proceedings, so that sufficient finality
appears lacking. In both cases, inquiry into the question of finality seems a
more direct, and therefore more suitable, mode of dealing with the issues
raised than that chosen by the court.
"Finality," as used by Frankfurter, is not the concept utilized by appellate
courts to determine the readiness of cases for appeal. Rather, the term
connotes a readiness of a given dispute for any adjudication by courts, for
judicial treatment overall. The term is certainly not self-defining; indeed, as
Justice Frankfurter states in his opinion, the "terms ... assume the answer."' ' 5
Often the "finality" test points to elements of a dispute which the court feels
must be present in order to reach an intelligent decision on the merits. Thus,
for example, the underlying facts must not be in a state of flux 66 so that the
court would be forced to construct a hypothetical fact situation and render
an essentially "advisory" opinion.57 In regulatory situations, where the act
demands special expertise in perceiving its policies and applying those policies
to fact situations, a court is deprived of carefully particularized judgments
by administrative "experts" if it takes jurisdiction on the merits before the
official entrusted with preliminary discretion to enforce the act has rendered
52. 341 U.S. at 152.
53. Id. at 153.
54. Id. at 154.
55. Id. at 151-52. See Bic=EL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 113-17 (1962).
56. The cases do not discuss this problem of finality in terms of factual instability,
a state of "flux"; rather the harm which plaintiffs allege is said to be too remote, Eccles
v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948) ; International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347
U.S. 222, 223-24 (1954) ; the official action has not yet been taken, and may never be taken;
the whole factual setting might change and the problems asserted may never arise. In
short, the "impact of actuality" is missing. See Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions,
37 HARv. L. REv. 1002, 1006 (1924). The clearest example of such a factual state of flux
appears in United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). See BICKEL, op. cit.
supra note 55, at 113-17 for detailed discussion.
57. See Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
475 (1930). See BicKmi, op. cit. spra note 55, defining an advisory opinion in terms of
finality: opinions are advisory when "they are not finally decisive, the power of ultimate
disposition of the case having been reserved elsewhere." Id. at 115. See Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937), the first exhaustive treatment by the Court
of the Declaratory Judgment Act.
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his final judgment.rs Neither of these problems appear to be presented in
Reisman and Rabinowitz, since both present on their pleadings all of the
material relevant to decision on the merits. In Reisman, the nature of the
documents sought is reasonably clear, and the tax investigations instituted
by the Internal Revenue Service illuminate the source of potential criminal
liability for which the privilege against self-incrimination is claimed.5 9 In
Rabinowitz, the nature of plaintiffs' relationship to the Cuban government
is known, so that full factual grounds for determination of the attorneys' status
under the Registration Act are provided.60
The allegations in Reisman and Rabinowitz suggest another problem of
finality. It might be suggested that judicial review will be possible at a later
stage of the proceedings when the issues would be better framed, unless later
proceedings would be precluded by voluntary surrender, in Reisman, and by
unwillingness to risk criminal penalties, in Rabinowitz.6' Were the allegations
of voluntary surrender in Reisman supported in fact,62 the court could not
justifiably decline to entertain the suit merely because of the high probability
that the taxpayers were utilizing the judicial proceedings to delay. The
suitor would then have been left with no subsequent opportunity to vindicate
58. This is a very generalized statement of the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction."
See Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907), the leading
case; see also United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956) ; Southwestern
Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411 (1959). The problems can
become complicated, and the justification for reliance upon administrative expertise is
accordingly greater, when there is an indication of conflict in the controlling substantive
law or statutory policies. See, e.g., Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S.
156 (1922), and Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
59. The documents in dispute at the time the Reisman case was argued before the
Supreme Court are only the books and records of certain domestic and foreign corporations
(the latter far outnumbered the former) in which the taxpayer allegedly held a minority
interest and which records he was holding in a "purely personal capacity." Brief for
Respondent, p. 53, Reisman v. Caplin (No. 119). The tax years which the government
is investigating are known, and the offense charged is clear, see note 10 supra.
60. See Judge Fahy's dissent, 318 F.2d at 184-85; Reply Brief for Petitioner on
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 5-6, Rabinowitz v. Kennedy (No. 287). The Attorney
General did not contest the plaintiffs' allegations that they performed only mercantile and
financial services for the Cuban Government; nevertheless, he contended that they must,
in any event, register under the Act. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 9-10 n.7, Kennedy v.
Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Since the issue appears to be one of statutory
interpretation, the record could hardly become more developed, or the "controversy" more
"actual," Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958), note 39 supra.
61. See notes 11 and 16 supra.
62. There is strong doubt as to whether the accountants are in fact willing to volun-
tarily comply with the summonses. See notes 11-12 supra. The accountant's answer (they
were joined as a defendants with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue), while admitting
every other allegation in plaintiffs' complaint, did not admit that they had informed
Reisman, et al., that they would comply. Rather it read as follows: "if the mentioned
Summonses are complied with and will have to be complied with, [the accountants] will
be called upon to deliver up . . ." the documents belonging to the plaintiffs (emphasis
added). Brief for Respondent, p. 45, Reisman v. Caplin (No. 119) ; see note 97 infra.
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his statutory or constitutional rights. If the accountants' voluntary compliance
with the subpoena, before it could be challenged, were certain, the court
would have to balance against the interests of efficient tax investigation the
prospect that there might later be no judicial proceeding which could effec-
tively vindicate the claimed right against self-incrimination. 63
In Leedom v. Kyne,6 4 the Supreme Court faced an analogous problem.
judicial review had been granted below on the merits of the National Labor
Relations Board's action in certifying both professional and non-professional
employees in the same bargaining unit without conducting a separate election
among the professional employees, as explicitly required by statute. In ap-
proving this review, the Court refused to follow the earlier case of Switch-
men's Union v. National Mediation Board 65 which had held that the desig-
nation of the bargaining unit under the Railway Labor Act, although arguably
contrary to the explicit provisions of the act, was within the unreviewable
discretion of the National Mediation Board. Justices Brennan and Frank-
furter dissented in Leedom, urging that Switchmen's Union be followed to
avoid delay and its concomitants: disruption of collective bargaining and in-
dustrial strife.66 Over a result which would have avoided these possibilities,
the majority preferred the enforcement of a right which because given, must
have been intended to be enforced.
6 7
The Leedom majority favored judicial, rather than exclusively adminis-
trative, review for protection of statutory "rights" ;68 this preference would
apply a fortiori where a constitutional right is at stake, as was alleged in
Reisman. Avoidance of the delay occasioned by judicial intervention in
Leedom, even if it produced the most severe consequences, would not serve
to justify an elimination of judicial review. The competing interests urged
63. While, in Reiswian, it appears that the allegations of threatened irreparable injury
were not firmly supported, note 62 supra, DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1962),
cert. granted, 32 U.S.L. WER: 3003 (July 2, 1963) (No. 159), a case also involving a
challenge to a subpoena issued against a third-party custodian, does seem a case in which
the conflict asserted in Reisman is present. In this litigation, a bank held records and
documents prejudicial to the taxpayer's interests. It indicated its willingness to comply
with the Service's summonses (313 F.2d at 84) and the Ninth Circuit held it proper to
entertain suit for an injunction against the bank and the government.
If later proceedings may in fact vindicate a complainant's rights, the Court has often
insisted that he exhaust his administrative remedies. This familiar doctrine, the "Doctrine
of Exhaustion," see generally 3 DAvis, ADmINISTRATrvE LAw TR-ATISE ch. 20 (1958),
and Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (the generally acknowl-
edged leading case), often appears in a delay-prevention context. See, e.g., Waterman
S.S. Corp. v. Land, 151 F.2d 292, 299-300 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (Arnold, J., dissenting),
reversed sub nor. Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946) ; Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943).
64. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
65. 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
66. 358 U.S. at 193.
67. Id. at 191; cf. note 46 supra.
68. 358 U.S. at 191.
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in Reisman are even more compellingly in favor of judicial intervention: on
the one side is the threat to the private party's constitutional right against
compulsory self-incrimination; on the other is the possibility of greater effi-
ciency in the investigatory functions of the Internal Revenue Service. Since
the Reisman plaintiffs may not have been in danger of having their constitu-
tional rights abrogated, the result is unexceptionable. 69 Yet, unless the argu-
ment for congressional intent to exclude other modes of relief is convincing,
the result ought to have been reached on the basis of non-justiciability, not
sovereign immunity. Even if the statutory argument convinces, that argument,
rather than the sweeping doctrine, with its train of stereotypes, ought to have
been advanced as dispositive. For, it will be noted, if the risks of irreparable
damage to plaintiffs' constitutional rights are present, the statutory argument
is considerably reduced in strength. The statutory procedure, primarily de-
signed to channel protection of constitutional rights into a special framework,
could not have been meant for use where it would exclude the possibility
of protecting those rights.
If, in Rabinowitz, the Attorney General's intention to enforce the Foreign
Agents Registration Act against the plaintiffs could not be substantiated, then,
as in Reisman, the danger of damage would be too remote to favor early review
over the benefits of administrative flexibility and efficiency. The posture would
be similar to Poe v. Ullman,"° where a declaratory judgment regarding the
constitutionality of the Connecticut birth control statute was denied because
there was no realistic threat that the statute would ever be enforced against
parties in the position of plaintiffs. As in the case of Reisnan, it would have
been possible to say without more that plaintiff presented no substantial
reason for the court to inject itself into possible conflict with the Executive."1
Even if later enforcement were likely, there would be strong reason for
judicial abstention, had the Attorney General not indicated that he had de-
termined that the act applied to complainants. Plaintiffs' claim to relief because
of their substantial peril would seem more or less evenly matched against
the ordinary reluctance which courts properly feel to interfere in govern-
mental processes. In this context it would become necessary to ask whether
there were any particular features to the fact complex out of which the liti-
gation arose or the statutory and administrative establishment created to
govern it which would either concern or reassure a court of its ability to pro-
ceed to the merits without disservice to itself or the government. One charac-
teristic of the factual environment of Rabinowitz, immediately relevant and
strongly suggestive of judicial inability to intervene with the sensitivity re-
quired by the case, is the cold war aspect of the administrative problem at
hand. In the highly charged political atmosphere surrounding present relations
with Cuba, the motives of the Attorney General in refusing to prosecute
69. On the reality of the danger see notes 12 and 62 supra.
70. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
71. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 155 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J, concurring).
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could be tied to considerations of foreign policy-a desire, for example, not
to antagonize the Cuban Government unnecessarily. Yet, the Attorney General
would be considerably embarrassed if a court granted review on the merits
for declaratory judgment and decided that the act did apply to the attorneys
for Cuba. The Attorney General could appear in court and specifically disclaim
any intention to prosecute Cuba's lawyers at that time, but this disclaimer
could embarrass the Executive in domestic politics, and might jeopardize a
program designed to alter our relationship with Cuba by prematurely forcing
divulgence of executive policy. The involvement of foreign policy considera-
tions has frequently made courts substantially doubtful of the propriety of
their participation in a cause.72 These doubts extend to both their own com-
petency and the wisdom of tying the hands of government policy-makers.
Together, they present strong reason for resisting the urge to review gov-
ernment action until the last possible moment.
Yet, in Rabinowitz, plaintiffs' argument is strong that for all practical pur-
poses, that moment is at hand. Although the Attorney General has not stated
with complete finality that he intends to prosecute the plaintiffs should they
fail to register under the Act, he has unequivocally indicated his belief that
they must register. 3 There is a substantial threat of enforcement, and the
plaintiffs' fears are far from being hypothetical. And the plaintiffs assert that
the penalty for non-compliance with the demand for registration is so severe
that they dare not await prosecution 74-an assertion of a type which, in
reasonably similar circumstances, courts have been willing to respect.7 r The
question remains whether there is such strong and valid reason for permitting
72. See, e.g., Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957);
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21, 22 (1963) ;
Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 236 (2d Cir. 1962). It
will be noted that in the above cases the courts speak of their reluctance to dispose of the
issues at stake in a manner likely to affect this country's international relations without
the presence of an "affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed." See also
Wulfsohn v. R.S.F.S.R., 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923).
73. See notes 5, 15, 60 mtpra; it is also noteworthy in this regard that the list of in-
dictments and convictions under the Foreign Agents Registration Act submitted to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee for inclusion in the record of its hearings on the
Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States
includes the names of petitioners, Victor Rabinowitz and Leonard B. Boudin. See Hear-
ings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. on Activities of Nondiplomatic Repre-
sentatives of Foreign Principals, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 70, 73 (1963).
74. 318 F.2d at 182 n.8.
75. The accepted doctrine is that, "if statutory penalties are so excessive as to effec-
tively deprive the complainant of the capability of violating the statute and then testing its
validity in an enforcement proceeding," a sufficient showing of threatened irreparable in-
jury has been made, and equity will intervene. Comment, Threat of Enforcement-Prc-
requisite of a Justiciable Controversy, 62 CoLuma. L. RFv. 106, 114 (1962). See Beal v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941) (suit entertained but relief denied on the merits).
Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331, 337 (1920) (suit entertained and relief
granted) ; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 147 (1908) ; Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Tucker, 230
U.S. 340, 349 (1913).
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prosecutorial definition of this statute's coverage as to lead a court to stay
its hand.
Traditional grounds for abstention from review are absent in Rabinowitz.
The statute cannot with certainty be characterized as "criminal" rather than
"regulatory" ;76 there is, moreover, no clear congressional statement that
judicial abstention would be desirable.77 But the relationship of the statute to
the national security-a factor which in other circumstances has often been
overriding in the decision to permit governmental inhibition of private ac-
tivity 78 -could well lead a court to conclude that, despite the lack of clarity
on these issues, the administrator should be left as free as is consistent with
constitutional principle to determine the application of the statute. It is not
difficult to see in the Foreign Agents Registration Act a congressional intent
to inhibit hostile foreign governments from obtaining competent counsel to
represent their legal interests in this country. It is clear from the time and
circumstances of its passage that the Registration Act was particularly directed
against hostile countries. 79 Statutory language supports the same conclusion,
76. See note 20 suepra; even if it were to be so characterized, it is doubtful if it
can be said with certainty that the moral turpitude which would bar declaratory relief is
involved; see note 22 supra, for comparable cases where suit for declaratory or equitable
relief was entertained. Moreover, the majority in Rabinowitz "philosophically agreed"
that a declaratory judgment might be proper due to the absence of "moral turpitude," 318
F.2d at 183. In dissent, Judge Fahy pressed this point home. 318 F.2d at 186.
77. The legislative history is silent on this point. See H.R. REP. No. 153, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); S. REP. No. 1783,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). Nor do there seem to be any reasons inherent in equity doc-
trines, the discretionary nature of which declaratory relief shares, which erect a barrier
to judicial intervention. See 318 F.2d at 184 (Fahy, J., dissenting).
78. See, e.g., the Japanese American Cases, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81 (1943) ; Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) ; and especially, Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) ; RosTow, TEE SOvREMIGN PREROGATIV ch. 7 (1962).
79. The act was passed in 1938 in the midst of nationwide concern with the activities
of the agents of the fascist dictatorships in this country. It grew out of the activities of
the McCormack Committee on Investigation of Nazi and Other Propaganda in 1935.
See H.R. REP. No. 153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) ; H.R. REPv. No. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937) ; S. REP. No. 1783, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). Hearings Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Comm. on Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign
Principals, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 3-4, 9-10, 52 (1963). See the judicial discussions
of its purposes, Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 241, 244 (1943) ; United States
v. Kelly, 51 F. Supp. 362 (D.C. D.C. 1943) ; and United States v. Auhagen, 39 F. Supp.
590, 591-92 (D.C. D.C. 1941). Moreover, it is apparent from the comprehensive list of
indictments and prosecutions under the act, submitted by the Department of Justice, that
the act has been most heavily used against agents of hostile foreign governments. There
are few exceptions in the several dozen cases listed. The act is apparently a useful com-
plement to the espionage laws. See Hearings, supra, id. at 64-73. The act is also a very
important adjunct to the Federal Lobbying Act, 60 Stat. 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70
(1958), in designating those who act on behalf of foreign countries, even though friendly,
to influence public and congressional opinion toward securing legislature or executive
favors, e.g., foreign aid. See Hearings, supra, id. at 2-51, 56-57, 79; see also the extensive
and varied list of registrants, id. at 101-15.
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for foreign agents of countries whose defense is deemed by the President to
be essential to the defense of the United States are exempted from the regis-
tration requirements.8 0 The statute's uses, both to harass those who choose
to associate with hostile governments and to discourage others from such
associations, are evident in the factual background of Rabinowitz. The question
presented by Rabinowitz is whether the declaratory judgment procedure is
available to diminish such uses, to reduce the aura of deterrence which other-
wise would surround the Act.
Declaratory relief would be supported by ample precedent 81 if the rights
at stake in Rabinowitz could be classified as constitutional. Thus, for example,
in the recent case of Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction,2 plaintiff had
brought an action for a declaration in the Florida state courts that the anti-
communist oath required of all employees of the State was unconstitutional.
Plaintiff, a teacher in Florida public schools, had been asked to swear to
this oath and had refused. He had not, however, been dismissed from his
job, nor had a perjury prosecution been instituted against him. In his allega-
tions, plaintiff stated that he was a "loyal American" and had not refused to
take the oath "for fear of the penalties provided by law for a false oath." The
Florida Supreme Court dismissed on the ground that, since by plaintiff's own
allegations he did not fear threat of enforcement, he lacked requisite standing
to sue. The Supreme Court, preliminary to finding the oath unconstitutionally
vague because it appeared to require a disclaimer of legitimate political ac-
tivities, found that the plaintiff had standing precisely because of the oath's
vagueness. 83 The Court read the allegations as meaning that plaintiff could
not confidently predict whether or not he would be liable to perjury prosecu-
tion at some time in the future, should he take the oath, so that a sufficient
"threat of enforcement" did exist to justify review of the merits.8 4 But it
seems difficult for plaintiffs in Rabinowitz to establish that they may be forced
to surrender, out of fear of criminal sanction, constitutional rights as impor-
tant as those involved in Cramp. Whether or not the act, on a true reading
of its scope, requires that they register as foreign agents and thus disclose the
details of their relationship with their foreign principal, there appears to be
no constitutional inhibition to prevent Congress from requiring such informa-
80. 52 Stat. 632 (1938), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 613(f) (1958).
81. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (declaratory and
other relief granted) ; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (declaratory relief granted) ;
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (declaratory and
other relief granted). See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), (in-
junctive relief granted), which exemplifies the pre-declaratory judgment Act cases,
where equity intervened to protect the asserted constitutional rights.
82. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
83. Id. at 284-85. The oath required Cramp to swear in writing, that inter alia, he
has never lent his "aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party,"
id. at 279.
84. Id. at 283-85.
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tion of them.8s Congress could reasonably have refused to exempt those who
represent the "financial and mercantile interest" of foreign governments from
the Registration Act on the grounds that any commercial relationship with
a foreign government predisposed the agent favorably toward that govern-
ment, thus the public should be alerted that the agent was not altogether
impartial in his expressed attitudes toward that government. Any supposed
constitutional right to privacy 8 could not withstand a congressional deter-
mination that publicity was requisite. If Congress intended that the act have
a broad deterrent impact, and if it could constitutionally have legislated to
the furthest reach of that impact, then the plaintiffs cannot rely on constitu-
tionally enshrined values to justify judicial review in anticipation of prosecu-
tion.
That plaintiff is not put at risk of losing constitutional liberties by the
registration requirement considerably diminishes his argument for court in-
tervention prior to the last possible moment for decision. Considerations of
national security and foreign relations remain highly relevant to the court's
estimate of both its own competency and the propriety of interference. And
these considerations may be conclusive where they are not counterbalanced
by some important right of plaintiffs and where they are supported by a
congressional policy of deterrence. Yet statutory uncertainty itself is sufficient
to make the conscientious judge squirm: regardless of the niceties of institu-
tional analysis and the boundaries of congressional and administrative pre-
rogative, he will feel his help is needed to alleviate a condition of uncertainty
which, ultimately, is his to resolve.
8 7
This impulse is an honest one, and deserves its place in the schemata of
values which the judge must confront in deciding whether to hear the petition
for declaratory relief. As seems to have been the case in Cramp, its influence
will be the more strongly felt the clearer is plaintiff's case on the merits. That
Congress clearly intended the "nonpolitical, financial and mercantile" exception
85. The Foreign Agents Registration Act has already withstood heavy constitutional
attack, see United States v. Peace Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.C. D.C. 1951).
Comparable registration Acts exist in other areas, requiring just as complete a disclosure
of business activities. See, e.g., Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 Stat. 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C.
§ 261-70 (1958) ; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3275-94, as amended in 1958 places an occu-
pational tax on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers: § 3294, requiring
detailed registration statements to be filed by such persons, has been upheld against
thorough-going challenge, United States v. Kabriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
86. The Rabinowitz plaintiffs alleged that the registration requirement would seriously
invade their privacy, Brief for Appellee, p. 3, Kennedy v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 181 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), requiring them to disclose virtually all their other activities, business and
non-business, in addition to their activities on behalf of Cuba. Ibid. That such is indeed
the case is questionable. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 244 (1943) where
the Court found nothing in the legislative history indicating that anything other than
"a statement of registrants' activities in behalf of their foreign principals" was required.
See also Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach's testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Hearings, supra note 79, at 73-81.
87. See, e.g., Fahy, J., dissenting in Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d at 186.
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to be available even to agents of hostile powers suggests that, as was the case
in Leedom v. Kyne,88 anticipatory relief might be given to protect the granted
exemption if the plaintiffs were clearly within the ambit of the clause.89 Yet,
plaintiffs are at the fringes of the exception's coverage at best: Cuba is an
avowedly socialistic state, and a court would be hard put to distinguish
Cuban financial and mercantile from Cuban political interests. Given further
that Cuba is a hostile country, and that there is some ground in the statute
for distinguishing the treatment of friendly and hostile governments under
the act,90 it might even appear likely that plaintiffs must register. Therefore,
if the act is to have prior deterrent impact on those to whom its provisions
might apply, the impulse to deny that that intent is governing in the par-
ticular case must be repressed.
The importance of the factor of deterrence in the analysis above can be
illustrated by comparison with Columbia Broadcasting System v. United
States,91 a case where the absence of this factor seems the best explanation
for the Court's granting review. In CBS, plaintiffs sought review of regula-
tions issued by the Federal Communications Commission under statutory
procedure similar to declaratory judgment. 92 The regulations indicated the
FCC's intent to deny licenses to radio stations maintaining certain proscribed
contractual relations with the national networks. Although no action enforcing
these regulations had been brought, and although enforcement proceedings
could not be brought against CBS itself, the Supreme Court nevertheless held
that CBS presented a justiciable claim for review on the merits of the validity
of the regulations. Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued in dissent that the cause
was not sufficiently final for review to be granted. In his view, in these re-
spects largely uncontradicted by the majority, the regulations were mere
"announcements of general policies . . . ,,,13 -the factual basis of the dispute
88. 358 U.S. 184 (1958). See discussion in text at notes 64-68 supra.
89. Leedom may, in fact, provide a rule for cases of this kind. Recently, the Court
said with regard to Leedom:
In that case judicial intervention was permitted since the Board's order was "in
excess of its delegated powers and contrary to specific prohibition in the Act."
(emphasis added).
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16 (1963). See
also the Second Circuit's comments on Leedom, in Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A.,
300 F.2d 222, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1962). If the exemption, written into the Foreign Agents
Registration Act, Section 3(d), quoted in full, note 4 supra, is viewed as a specific limi-
tation on the Attorney General's authority over persons situated as the Rabin owitz plain-
tiffs allegedly are, then the granting of anticipatory relief to enforce this exemption
would seem to follow from the Leedom principle. See discussion in text at notes 64-68
supra, and note 46 supra.
90. See text at note 80 supra.
91. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
92. Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 219 (1913), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1398,
2321-25 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 17(9) (1958), and the Federal Communications Act § 402(a),
48 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1958).
93. 316 U.S. at 431.
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was still in flux, and the Court was being asked to act before it could have
the benefit of the agency's expert judgment in shaping the policy of the
Communications Act to a particularized fact situation.94 Against this charac-
terization of the posture of the case, the grant of anticipatory review is best
explained as derived from the context of the Federal Communications Act.
The Commission was engaged in regulating normal business relationships
where it is desirable for the line between permissible and impermissible
conduct to be drawn with precision. Furthermore, the local stations with
more obvious "standing" could not be expected, because of the dispropor-
tionate risk in case of error, to test the regulations' extent or validity.95
Ultimately, the issue in Rabinowitz seems to resolve into the extent of
deterrence of affiliation with hostile foreign governments desired by Congress.
Certainly the requirements of registration and disclosure of the business de-
tails of plaintiffs' Cuban affiliation are not excessively onerous,96 though
registration-or continued uncertainty-might tend to deter others from ac-
cepting Cuba, or similarly situated countries, as a client. The issue finally
poses itself as the extent to which a hostile foreign government should be
inhibited in securing access to the courts of this country through hiring
competent counsel; regarding this question the Registration Act is ambiguous.
But on its resolution depends both the question whether plaintiffs will be
required to register as foreign agents, and whether they will be granted
anticipatory review to determine the former proposition.
Thus, many considerations play a role in reaching a reasoned disposition
of cases like Reisman and Rabinowitz. In the light of the statutes at issue,
what can it be said that Congress intended with regard to the granting of
anticipatory relief? Do the issues raised involve areas of low judicial compe-
tency, areas where courts should properly hesitate to enter unless absolutely
convinced that such intervention is required? Is a vital national policy or
interest at stake? Does the plaintiff present a case compelling the exercise of
94. Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued that the Commission might be expected
to depart from the general regulations where such departure is in the public
interest [and] to dilute them with amendments and exceptions. The construc-
tion of the regulations . . . is still in the hands of the Commission. Administrative
adjudication is still open. Before its completion it is not ripe for judicial review.
316 U.S. at 433 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
95. If a local station violated the regulations and then lost its "test case," it might
easily lose its license. In this sense the regulations were self-enforcing and the status of
the litigation could be no more "final" than it was. Irreparable injury to CBS was clearly
in the offing; for local radio stations had already indicated their intention to cancel or
refuse to review their contracts, 316 U.S. at 423. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 536 (1925) ; Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1916). Davis, Ripeness of Governmental Action for Judicial Review,
68 HARv. L. Rav. 1326, 1327-28, 1367-68 (1955). Arguably, Rabinowitz may be viewed
in a similar manner, $10,000 in fines and/or 5 years imprisonment might have the effect
of making the statute self-enforcing; i.e., the luxury of a challenge to its applicability
may be too expensive. See discussion in note 75 supra and cases cited.
96. See note 86 supra.
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judicial discretion in his favor: is his position on the merits strong? Are his
risks of injury immediate and serious, and do they rise to constitutional
dimensions? Would anticipatory relief negate whatever deterrent impact
Congress might have intended to bring to bear upon the activities in which
plaintiffs are engaged? Assessed against the background of such considera-
tions, the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeals in Rabinowitz
may be correct. And, in Reisman, the result may be even more confidently
approved.97 But, in both cases, the use of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
as a means of expressing the court's conclusion masks the elements which
should control judicial reasoning. The sovereign immunity doctrine does not
itself contradict the notion that justiciability hinges on the danger of interfer-
ence with proper governmental functions balanced against the nature of the
harm threatened to the private complainant. Nevertheless, the component
elements of the doctrine are so relatively stereotyped, and so heavily weighted
toward protection of government interests, that invocation of the doctrine is
not accompanied by the necessarily fine weighing of conflicting interests. The
D.C. Circuit's essential error in Reisman v. Caplin and Kennedy v. Rabinowitz
was conceptual; it chose to discuss the cases in terms of a doctrine which did
not yield the most fruitful characterization of the issues raised.
97. As this Note was going to press, the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Reisman, affirming the Court of Appeals on the sole ground that "petitioners have an
adequate remedy at law and that the complaint is therefore subject to dismissal for want
of equity." Reisman v. Caplin, 32 U.S.L. WaaE 4105 (Jan. 20, 1964) ; see notes 12 and
62 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 73:493
